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82.
He further complains that there was no periodic review of his detention at reasonable intervals throughout his detention contrary to this provision. He refers, in these respects, to the principles developed by the Court in the Winterwerp Case (judgment of 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, p. 23 para. 55) X. v. United Kingdom (loc. cit.) and the Van Droogenbroeck case (loc. cit.).
83. The Government, referring to the decision of the Court in the Vagrancy case (judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, p. 40, para. 76) maintain that the supervision required by Art. 5(4) was Incorporated in the machinery of the court of trial and the appeal from it.
84. The Commission recalls its previous case-law relating to judicial review during sentences of life imprisonment. In Kotälla v.
the Netherlands, a case concerning a convicted war criminal, it stated the following (D.R. 14 at p. 240):
"While the Commission recognises the desirability of such a requirement in the administration of criminal justice, it finds no provision of the Convention, including Article 3 invoked by the applicant, which can be read as requiring that an individual serving a lawful sentence of life imprisonment must have that sentence reconsidered by a national authority, judicial or administrative, with a view to its remission or termination."
85.
This view was reaffirmed in the case of a convicted murderer who was sentenced to life imprisonment and complained of the absence of provision for judicial control of the lawfulness of her continued detention (Application N° 9089/80, X v United Kingdom, D.R. 24 pp. 227-231). In this application the Commission drew a clear borderline between cases of detention of persons of unsound mind under Art. 5(1)(e) and detention of persons serving life imprisonment after conviction by a competent court (Art. 5(1)(a)). The Commission reasoned as follows:
"On the one hand the validity of the continued confinement of a person of unsound mind under Article 5(1)(e) depends upon material criteria l.e. the persistence of a mental disorder which warrants his compulsory confinement. As a person's mental health may change, may improve, and thus the reasons necessitating