19.
9787/82
71. In this regard the Court has stated in the Van Droogenbroeck case that the Convention allows "a measure of indeterminacy in sentencing and does not oblige the Contracting States to entrust to the courts the general supervision of the execution of sentences" (loc. cit., p. 22, at para. 40).
72. In principle, apart from considerations relating to Art. 3 which are not pertinent to the present application, questions relating to sentencing of criminal offenders fall outside the purview of the Convention. Indeed there is no incompatibility with the Convention in the imposition of a life sentence as a security or retributive measure in a particular case or in a decision to keep a recidivist or habitual offender at the disposal of the Government (see e.g. Application N° 7994/77, Kotälla v. Netherlands, D.R. 14 p. 238).
73.
Nor does the Convention confer, in general, a right to release on licence or that parole decisions be taken by or subject to review by a court. (see e.g. Application N° 9089/80, X v. United Kingdom D.R. 24 pp. 228-229). Moreover, it is clear that the executive must enjoy a certain discretion in implementing or executing decisions of the court entrusted to its supervision.
74.
However, in cases such as the present, where the prisoner is only meant to be detained as long as he poses a threat to public safety, there must exist a sufficient connection between the original conviction and the decision to re-detain. As the Court reaffirmed in the Van Droogenbroeck case, with reference to an executive decision to re-detain an habitual offender, such a link becomes less strong with the passage of time (loc. cit., p. 22, at para. 40).
Application of principles to the facts of the case
75. The Commission must thus examine whether a sufficient connection existed between the original conviction in 1966 and the applicant's re-detention in 1977. Bearing in mind the sentencing objectives as explained above by the courts (see paras. 28 and 29) and the exceptional nature of the applicant's detention, the Commission must determine whether the applicant's behaviour was so related to the original offence that it could give rise to a well founded fear that he was a danger to public safety.
76. The applicant points out that the Home Secretary revoked his licence without hearing any representations on his part to explain his behaviour. He maintains that when he did have an opportunity to call evidence and make representations through counsel during his trial on 3 October 1977 the trial judge and two magistrates took a more sympathetic view of his behaviour. Judge Streeter accepted that the applicant was not a typical case of a person who, when released on parole, reverted back to crime (see above, para. 34).