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original conviction and sentence to life imprisonment in 1966. Accordingly he was lawfully detained after conviction by a competent court" within the meaning of Art. 5(1)(a) of the Convention.
60.
The applicant submits that having been at liberty for fifteen months it was no longer open to the Government to justify his re-detention with reference to his original conviction. He claims that the link was broken with this conviction and that a conviction on a minor charge could not be used to re-activate it. His detention would only have been lawful in 1977 if it had been ordered by a court.
61.
The Government, on the other hand, submit that the applicant's behaviour gave rise to the apprehension that he was a danger to the public. Thus there was a sufficient connection between his detention after recall and his original conviction for purposes of Art. 5(1)(a).
62.
The relevant parts of Art. 5(1) are as follows:
"1.
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
No
Relevant principles in the present case
There is no dispute between the parties that the applicant's detention after his conviction in 1966 was justified under Art. 5(1)(a) as a lawful detention after conviction by a competent court. The issue to be decided, in the present case, is whether his re-detention after fifteen months of liberty, can be justified under Art. 5(1)(a) with reference to this conviction.
64.
It is clear, in this respect, that the word 'after' in sub-paragraph (a) does not simply mean that the "detention" must follow the 'conviction' in point of time. As the Court has indicated In the case of X v United Kingdom (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of
5 November 1981, Series A no. 46, p. 17 para. 39) the detention must result from, follow and depend upon or occur by virtue of the conviction.
65. However in assessing this question in the present case, the Commission must look beyond appearances and the language used and look at the realities of the situation (see in this context, Eur. Court