SECRET
C
3.
accurate
Redacted under FOI Exemption S 27(1)
In my view the paper
i s well argued, and gives an
assessment of the likely Chinese attitude to the
various options. The re are one or two detailed points which
we will take up with Hong Kong, but we are sure that the
paper's recommendations are broadly right. The original aim of proposing the creation of an internal security force
during the negotiations was to remove the need for the stationing of PLA troops in Hong Kong. Chinese leaders have now made it clear that PLA units will be based in Hong Kong, and the proposal has therefore lost most
its rationale.
The alternative of going for а strengthened Police Tactical Unit seems to us to be the best available option.
of
4. We had originally intended to wait until we had reached
firm decisions on the timetable of implementation of the
plan, and its consequences for garrison rundown before We
made any approach on the is sue to the Chinese. We would be.
unlikely to be ready to do this before late
Governor has however argued that we should Chinese at an early stage that we have decided not
internal security force.
an
1986.
The
reassure
the
to opt for
We
can see the attractions in eliminating Chinese suspicions at
an early stage in this way, and think that this proposal
deserves very serious consideration.
5. The Governor will put this paper to EXCO on 7 January. Assuming that EXCO agree it, the Hong Kong Government will
then make a formal recommendation to us,
on which we will
submit to Ministers here. There will need to be a parallel
submission in the MOD.
It will be for consideration whether or not the limited to
issue of which general direction to pur sue on garrison replacement would need to be put to OD(K) once the Secretary
of State and the Defence Secretary are agreed on it. Once the decision has been made it will be necessary to look
6.
SECRET