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DSR 11C
1997. And the Chinese Government, whom we could in
theory approach now, would probably be dismissive of any
suggestion that the SAR Government should in effect stand
11 all Hong
k
as guarantors for BN(0)s. Their position is that (the Kong Chinese Cambatrist's whether they are idics on not
feat bling of recovery
posuere
One wary of seekin
reichmat
ній
waw be to
**
vast majority of BDTCSfare Chinese citizens, whom they
have reluctantly agreed should use a foreign travel
document (they do not recognise the BN (0) status as a
form of British nationality, nor the passport that goes
with it).
of
While there is no usay hassessing the possible cast of a spec, fic Commitment is repatriate BN()s 15 Hong Kong of indeed the probability
ō
7
In practice however BN (0) repatriations are likely
• [the
to be few; the great majority of those repatriated to
Hong Kong would no doubt repay their debt, as they do.
no
e
We could adopt a practice of withdrawing the
passports of BN (0)s seeking repatriation and replacing
them by single-journey travel documents, or of restricting
their validity to the single journey to Hong Kong. Such
restrictions would remain until the repatriation debt was
repaid.
While this is not thickt
acasali, speakin/ an experience lows for has privolal
volvend
only? Pakistan
which for reason in frot
the samt
Tengine
Comething/as
7. An argument against extending an undertaking to
repatriate destit
lestitute BN (0)s to Hong Kong after 30 June hitherto
only in excytul trimite 1997 is that we have not hitherto repatriated British
[ssa geval bale I nationals to a foreign country? To do so might set an
!
awkward precedent as regards, for example, BOCs living
Where is a kaba counte ayuwaveme_ inMax, Malaysia. But we could certainly argue that
Hong Kong is a unique and special case.
8.
We have invested much political capital in the BN (0) status and in gaining worldwide acceptance for it. Such
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