32
As noted in paragraph 25 above, the Executive Council has already provided an initial steer against the BRB's proposal for a Radio and Television Complaints Tribunal. The Administration has studied this proposal and maintains the view that the creation of a separate Tribunal would with some justification be regarded as over-zealous control of the media, and may revive suspicions that the Government is
is trying to create a parallel and quasi-judicial system. It is noted too that there has been only limited public enthusiasm for the idea of a Tribunal. The Administration considers that with
with CTEL acting purely as the executive arm of the Broadcasting Authority, the executive and judicial functions presently vested in CTEL will be adequately separated. It is considered too that a more effective and publicly accountable Authority will result in improved regulation of the Broadcasting industry, in which case the arguments for a separate Complaints Tribunal would largely disappear. The Administration therefore recommends that a Complaints Tribunal should not be created, and considers that in the event of any future disagreement over a decision of the Commissioner for Television or the Broadcasting Authority, the courts of law can provide an adequate avenue for appeal.
CORPORATE STRUCTURE OF THE BROADCASTING LICENSEES
33
The Broadcasting Review Board was concerned at the virtual monopolisation of television by one of the two television licensees, TVB, and suggested that this monopoly situation had in part been achieved due to TVB's position in a conglomerate of companies in the entertainment field, many of which companies have commercial
commercial relations with the licensee. Existing legislation, the Board charged, is inadequate to prevent a number of abuses occurring by virtue of these corporate links, notably
(a) licensee may be subject to
to pressure from other companies in the group;
(b)
(c)
a licensee is able to form mutually beneficial but exclusive links with other
in
the
group
-
companies
for example by giving preferential airtime and promotion of artists belonging to sister companies; or
the licensee is able to shift profits sister companies
royalty payments.
to
in order to minimise its