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largely to push Hong Kong's case for further resettlement. so, this would prejudice the group against our involvement. I explained that (although we could not ignore our responsiblity for Hong Kong) this was not the case (see (c) above) and he said that this also should be made clear when possible.
(e) He also suggested that we should play up our advantage in having an Embassy in Hanoi (unlike the US and Canada). The Ambassador duly referred to this at our lunch the following day.
(f) The Group would consider UK's request for involvement on 11 October. He would not predict the outcome but was more sanguine
that the reverse.
4. I should add that Mr Woodhouse of HKG (as well as Miss Walker of UKMIS) was present in this discussion: I checked with him afterwards that he was fully content with the line I had taken on theHong Kong angle of the problem. The discussion with the Canadians helped me to draw up a short list of points to make (attached) for the Ambassador to use at the following day's lunch.
5.
The lunch with the Honolulu Group (list attached) is fully recorded in UKMIS Telno 521. I would add only a few personal impressions:
(a) Under only a little probing, the differences between the big 3 (the Japanese just keep their heads down) became very clear. The Americans are preoccupied with ODP and the beastliness of the Vietnamese; the Australians with the need for a political solution in Indochina (which one Australian at the lunch described egregiously as "their [Australians] region); and the Canadians with the (il)logic of endless resettlement (one Canadian echoed a ringing Australian phrase in plenary: "resettlement is no longer part of the solution: it is part of the problem").
(b) At the start of our discussion, clear reservations emerged about the new HC. The Australian ambassador regarded M. Hocké's possible involvement in the group, partly in view of the broader view of his mandate that he seemed prepared to take, as a "mixed blessing". However, in the course of subsequent discussion an IGC consensus seemed to emerge that UNHCR involvement was both desirable and inevitable.
(c) All agreed that the success of the Lao screening exercise would be something of a key to the rest of the Indochina problem: the Australians and Canadians both understood that the Laotians had now finally agreed to take back those screened out; and the north Vietnamese in Hong Kong would present the best place to start any similar programme with Vietnamese.
(d) The IGC meeting scheduled for 11 October would be something of a watershed; with the HC present to answer questions (unspecified) put to him at the last meeting; with the UK request to consider; and with the attendance of Mr Simington, a
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