CONFIDENTIAL
2
resources, African governments experience far more difficulty in catering for refugee populations. In practice, UNHCR
in Dakar tends to pay for almost all the assistance given
C
to refugees, including sometimes part of the cost of government or Red Cross personnel attached to their programmes.
As UNHCR's financial commitment grows, so does their ability
to influence policy, which normally resides in Government hands.
5.
Ensuring that the money devoted to rehabilitation and assistance programmes is well spent is a major task for UNHCR. The success of such programmes can by no means always be guaranteed, partly because of the unfavourable economic climate in Dakar, where even well-qualified Senegalese find it hard to obtain employment, and partly because some of the financial assistance may be abused.
6.
UNHCR's main official contacts are with the Senegalese National Committee for refugee assistance and the Senegalese Red Cross, which is in itself a quasi-governmental body. As a rule the government is well disposed to refugees but has difficulties in finding necessary funds. The Government does not hinder the local UNHCR office in carrying out its work. The refugees generally fit in well with the Senegalese although there may be instances of jealousy on the Senegalese side, since refugees' allowances are generally slightly higher than the Senegalese legal minimum income. There are few NGO's working in the same area in Senegal (Church World Service of USAID is an exception) and consequently no real problems of duplication or demarcation of work. The regional office in Dakar has sub-offices in Benin, Burkina, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo but the nearest full regional office is in Kinshasa. There is therefore no real scope for coordination of UNHCR's work outside its own region.
7. The relatively calm political circumstances in this part of West Africa (coups apart) make it unnecessary for UNHCR
CONFIDENTIAL
/to undertake