CONFIDENTIAL
真
A
n
considerably our
P
assist
diplomatic campaign
to which
SCORRI attached great importance to persuade by example
other countries to resettle more refugees from Hong Kong.
We considered that they would perceive a UK commitment
limited to the family reunion cases as belated fulfilment
of our moral duty rather than as a special gesture meriting a response in kind.
6.
The matter was resolved in correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr Brittan. They agreed that the
decision to accept the family reunion cases need not be
taken to H Committee. However in commenting on the final
draft of the Government's Reply, the Prime Minister
subsequently took the view that the question of our
accepting SCORRI's recommendations on the admission of
further Vietnamese from Hong Kong should have been taken to
H Committee since the decision to admit the family reunion
cases was "a damaging one".
The Diplomatic Campaign
7.
Although our acceptance of only the family reunion
cases reduced the prospects for the success of our diplomatic campaign, our efforts have nevertheless produced
offers of some 1,000 new places (details at Annex). In
addition to these the US, which has not fixed a ceiling for
its intake from Hong Kong for the 1986 fiscal year (to end-September), is nevertheless resettling Hong Kong
refugees at an annual rate of 200-300
its above
FY 1985
ceiling of 1,600 places. In the light of these responses
Hong Kong has also decided, in accordance with another
SCORRI recommendation, to absorb a further 250 refugees
from the camps.
8. However most of the additional offers of resettlement
places are for a fixed number of refugees, to be accepted
in the current calendar year or over a 12-month period. There is no indication that any will be renewed thereafter. In several cases eg the US, Canada and Australia
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this
CONFIDENTIAL