TGIAPL
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Reference..
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HKK 243/11
RA
NOTE FOR FILE
HKK 243/11
GRCFIVENI REGISTRY
10 SEP 1986
NOTE OF MEETING IN HKD, 4PM, 6 AUGUST 1986
BETWEEN HOME OFFICE AND HKD OFFICIALS
Those Present:
Rawsthorne ) B1 Division, Underwood ) IND,
Kornicki ) Home Office
Tel soul,
515/6
CODE 18-77
PA
✓
Meli
Hum Leeks
) HKD
)
1.
Home Office advised that present position on resettlements from Hong
Hong Kong under SCORRI commitment is 408 accepted as at end-July, and 60 in pipeline for August. HO now writing advise agencies to cease putting cases forward.
to
2.
Home Office consider that origin of 500 commitment is obscure; nevertheless their Ministers consider that that is the present limit which
which they have
they have undertaken to accept from Hong Kong. Α further decision on whether to accept more from Hong Kong will be taken by Home Office Ministers after Mr Waddington's forthcoming visit to Hong Kong at the end of September to review situation on the ground. Meanwhile Home Office are concentrating on their commitment to accept approximately 60 cases from elsewhere in
in South East Asia (although we understand voluntary agencies have already put forward a number considerably in excess of the 60 originally identified).
3.
Home Office consider that tactically
that tactically it would be difficult in any
event for decisions to be taken in August or September because of Ministerial absences. They would also wish to touch base with Cabinet in view of No 10's comment on the draft of the SCORRI report last September. In conclusion Rawsthorne's view was if we want a decision on a
further offtake before the end of September a further Ministerial approach would be required. He was not optimistic of a positive Ministerial response.
He
4. Hum outlined our strategy for a long-term solution. explained that this strategy would take at least months, and probably years, before it could lead to any resolution of the continuing problem of Vietnamese arrivals in Hong Kong. In the meantime we had to consider the immediate situation in Hong Kong, and the only solution available for the immediate problem appeared to be continuing resettlement from Hong Kong to the UK to encourage others to copy our example. HKD considered that for a further resettlement effort
effort to be practicable UK would need to make a commitment to accept a further 500 or SO cases from Hong Kong. We considered what these might comprise! Home Office advised that there were 400 or SO more cases whom the voluntary
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