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sides would try to use the UN to their own advantage. Mr Renton suggested that the time might be right for renewed UN involvement. The Iranians appeared in a stronger military position, which would not help the prospects for a ceasefire. Mr Perez de Cuellar commented that he found it very difficult to know who exercised power within Iran.
4.
Afghanistan
Mr Renton asked whether there were signs of genuine Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and about the state of the UN negotiations. Mr Perez de Cuellar was gloomy since he felt that the Summit would have reduced US/Soviet willingness to talk about Afghanistan. The UN could provide some face-saving mechanism but a solution required determination from the Super Powers. The UN had done some good work but the progress was only procedural and the UN could not talk directly with the resistance movement since the Kabul Government was in the UN seat in New York.
5.
Indo-China
Mr Renton asked how the problem of increasing numbers of refugees from Indo-China should be tackled. There were large numbers of Cambodians seeking refuge in Thailand. There was also a continuing inflow of Vietnamese economic migrants in Hong Kong which was creating difficulties for the territory.
Mr Perez de Cuellar confined his response to Kampuchea where he believed that the Vietnamese had a plan for reconciliation between the conflicting parties. The Chinese position had also softened, particularly concerning the role of Pol Pot in an eventual solution.
6.
The Rekjavik Summit
Mr Renton gave a short account of Mr Shultz's briefings of the North Atlantic Council on 13 October. Although Britain was disappointed, there was plenty now to build on. Mr Perez de Cuellar thought it had been a mistake to hold a Summit when not enough of the ground had been prepared. It was morally praise-worthy but perhaps technically mistaken. Mr Renton quoted Mr Shultz's remark that it was "better to try"
Distribution
UND
MED
SAD
SEAD
HKD
ACDD
Soviet Dept
PS/Mr Renton
UKMIS NEW YORK
JB
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