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Both the Philippines and Indonesian governments might be more hospitable if it was made
clear that they would not have to bear any of the cost of resettlement, and would in
practise benefit substantially from a resettlement operation.
Who should foot the bill? The United States, which has done so much to help with the
problem of the refugees in the past decade, might perhaps be asked to meet between
five and ten percent of the cost, while the European Community, with the United Kingdom,
in the lead, might make a similar contribution. More than 80 percent of the cost, however, should be borne by the Japanese.
Would the bill be very large? From every point of view, it would be desirable to keep the cost down. I understand that the UNHCR pays about £5 per day per refugee in Hong
Kong. I would envisage pump priming costs about 5 times as high as that, during the
launching period. The per capita costs of Indonesia's own internal resettlement pro-
gramme should provide a suitable benchmark. What is needed is basically a simple, subsidised resettlement scheme, for simple village people. It must offer the prospect
of a respectable life for those taking part, but it must not be so lavish that it will encourage a massive increase in the number of people trying to leave Vietnam.
Who would be allowed to participate? Basically, it would be a programme for the
Vietnamese and the Vietnamese alone. It would not be appropriate to include in it the
90,400 Laotians who have crossed into Thailand. For ethnic reasons, the Thais can cope
more easily with the Lao-Mong problem than they can with the Vietnamese. The Lao govern-
ment is certainly communist, but it also seems to be weak, ineffective, and relatively
harmless. If there is a marginal change of policy in Vientiane, it is possible that
many of the mong tribesmen will drift back across the Mekong. The Vietnamese cannot
drift back home.
In the same way, this resettlement proposal would not really be meant for the 27,700
Khmer now living in camps in Thailand. The situation in Kampuchea could change quite
dramatically in the next couple of years, if Moscow decided that this impediment to
better relations with Beijing should be defused. It is not impossible to imagine political changes in Kampuchea which could allow the 27,000 Khmer to go home.
Once again, however, this qualification does not apply to the 6,700 Vietnamese in
Thailand. At the moment, more than 5,000 Vietnamese a year are setting out in boats
undeterred by the thought of Thai pirates (if they go south), or of closed camps (if
they go north) and it would be unwise to assume that this number will diminish in
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the foreseeable future. It would, therefore, be necessary for a resettlement scheme
to be big enough to be able to take the thousands who will still want to live outside
Vietnam.