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hope of a long term solution not only to the Vietnamese refugee problem in Hong Kong but also in the rest of the region. For the latter reason at least, it should be welcome to the other resettlement countries. Further, on the basis of our recent discussions, I believe that it would be both acceptable to, and supported by, the refugee agencies.
It is only, I believe, within the framework of such an internationally agreed
agreed approach that a further resettlement commitment would make any sense, and only within that context would it be possible to give effect to our additional SCORRI commitment to consider taking "a further small number" of Vietnamese in the light of other States' response to our initial commitment. In the meantime, there are а number of places available under the existing SCORRI commitments (for example none of the promised 60 non-Hong Kong cases have been taken) as well as under our RASRO commitment. While we are reaching decisions on future policy, these commitments should constitute sufficient
evidence of continuing movement to avoid the kind of hiatus to
which you refer in your minute of 15 September.
If you agree that we should proceed in this way, I propose that we should ask David Waddington and Tim Renton to work out the details. These should include the arrangements and timetable for a Joint approach between the main resettlement countries and the UNHCR to the problem of Vietnamese refugees as a whole; the conditions to be satisfied before the UK should
agree to accept any further resettlement; and the size and nature of
of any such commitment. When we have settled a plan between us we shall need, of course, to seek our colleagues'
agreement to it.
x? what dors this mean
R
Доцільний.
12 November 1986
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