Reference.......
particularly as regards Vietnamese arrivals who were the least welcome of all throughout the region.
6.
of
in
of
He summarised the main features of humane deterrence Thailand and Hong Kong as a freeze on resettlement, a lack outside contact, restrictions on the activities
voluntary agencies in the camps, and austere camp conditions (not in terms of food but in terms of the space provided for refugees within the camps). He added that these policies were accompanied in both cases by attempts to pursue repatriation (he was aware that Hong Kong in 1983-84 was beginning to explore the idea of returning refugees to Vietnam). He highlighted the dilemma that both Thailand and Hong Kong faced that despite resettlement freezes both wanted refugees out of their camps possible but recognised that the only feasible means of doing so was by resettlement.
1.
"
as soon as
Effect: He concluded from the arrival rates in both places that the case for humane deterrence was non-proven.
He noted that Lao and boat arrivals in Thailand did fall substantially between 1981 and 1982, as did boat arrivals in Hong Kong between 1982 and 1983; however he noted that regional arrival rates were dropping anyway and that in 1986 Hong Kong has seen a dramatic increase in arrivals. He also felt that falling arrival rates were due to
number a
of other factors such as
in the change
US refugee processing criteria in early 1982. He also noted that the Thai resettlement "ban" was not maintainable and was lifted in early 1983 for Lao and Vietnamese.
8.
to humane
of
treatment
UNHCR: McNamara stated that the UNHCR attitude deterrents was to regard it as an invitation to a widening tendency
provide increasingly harsh asylum seekers. UNHCR attitudes were coloured by the fact that apparent prison conditions appeared
to be being endorsed by two
to
fo the major western donor nations to the UNCHR, the US and the
UNHCR also regarded austere camp conditions
as questionable in terms of the various refugee conventions.
UK.
9.
cure a
Conclusion: McNamara concluded that humane deterrence as a concept was more of а reaction to
for it, problem than a and that it created problems of its own. While recognising that most of his conclusions were delivered with the benefit of hindsight he felt that many of the problems that led to the Thai and
Hong Kong reaction in the early 1980s might have been avoided if from the start a series of international steps had been taken
the following lines:
on
(a)
for
an attempt to project the number of arrivals and an early recognition of the need to discriminate rather than accept all arrivals as refugees third
country resettlement;
coordinated policy on aid and material conditions in all the Thai camps;
(b)
a
CODE 18-77
AWO Ltd.
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