CONFIDENTIAL
12. The Secretary of State mentioned that he had recently discussed with Herr Klepsch relations between the Council and the Parliament. The UK intended to do what it could to ease that relationship during our Presidency.
Hong Kong: Refugees from Vietnam
J
A
13.
Genscher The Secretary of State spoke to his brief. took note, and said he would investigate the possibilities. He noted, however, that the problem was very much one for the Länder. He also mentioned the activities of a German mercy ship (presumably that identified in Hong Kong telegram number
amber you 1085, though Genscher in fact used a different name).
East/West Relations
14. Invited to so so by Genscher, the Secretary of State
Genscher described the present state of UK/Soviet relations. touched on the appointment of Kvitsinski as Ambassador to Bonn. He added that Shevardnadze was expected to visit Bonn somewhere between June and mid-July. This was passed on in confidence (please protect until we get it from some other source).
15. Genscher said that in all his recent contacts with East European and Soviet interlocutors he had banged his MBFR drum hard. It was clear that we had a very good case to make.
[your]
16. He then raised CW. This was important in the FRG partly because of the activity of the SPD, who were making much of the need for a CW-free zone in Central Europe, and partly because it was inherently attractive to public opinion. It was important for the West to keep on the offensive in pressing for a worldwide ban, and for Soviet concessions on verification. The FRG was the only country in Europe where chemical weapons were stationed. It was worrying that Congress had now approved binary production, making that dependent on inclusion in the "force goals" context, and the willingness of the Europeans to station such weapons. The Germans were not prepared to accept deployment "in peacetime" - only "in certain circumstances". Nor did they want to be singled out as the only relevant European country in this connection. And, finally, they could not accept "deployment after consultations" but only deployment with their consent and with the agreement of NATO as a whole.
17. Turning to CSCE, Genscher stressed the importance of careful preparation for the Vienna meeting. The West should aim to determine the agenda. CSCE continued to provide us with major opportunities to keep the Russians on the defensive.
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/18.