XCC(86)158
Page
2
5
(c)
(d)
Arguments for a CPF in Hong Kong (paragraph 10);
Arguments against a CPF (paragraph 11);
(e) Fiscal implications (paragraphs 13 - 15);
(£) Labour market implications
(paragraphs 16 - 20);
(g) Macroeconomic implications (paragraphs 21 ~30);
(h) Monetary and investment implications
(i)
(paragraphs 31
-
34);
Public service implications (paragraph 35);
(j) Employee reaction (paragraphs 36 -
(k) Employer reaction (paragraph 42).
41);
The second part places the social
social arguments for a Central Provident Fund in context by considering the extent to which the benefits of a CPF are already being provided by other means. This part of the paper is structured as follows:
(a)
Housing benefits (paragraph 44);
(b)
Social security benefits
(paragraphs 45 - 49);
(c)
Medical benefits (paragraph 50);
6
(d) Employment benefits (paragraphs 51 60).
-
·63)
The final part of the paper (paragraphs 61 suggests an alternative strategy to establishment of a CPF and leads on (in paragraph 64) to a summary, as follows, of the themes which emerge from the discussion:
(a)
A CPF would, depending upon
upon the amount and period of contribution, provide some degree of retirement provision for those who have been in employment, but would not be of significant benefit to those most in need, namely those who have been unable to work, have worked only irregularly or who have been on a low wage.
result
(b) Accordingly, а CPF would be unlikely
in a significant reduction in
of claims under existing security provisions.
burden
to
the
social