HONG KONG CONSULTANCY DRAFT MODIFICATIONS TO ATTACHMENT 'A'
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MODIFICATIONS TO SECTION 4.2 'STUDY B ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT'
4.2.1) completed
4.2.3 )
4.2.2
deleted and replaced by:
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(1)
The consultants shall, after the completion of the initial assessment and the submission of the report to HKG, reply to such reasonable elucidatory questions concerning the assessment as are transmitted to them by the HKG and shall liaise with the HKG concerning the provision of information required for the second phase of the assessment (paragraph (ii) below). In furtherance of this objective, two persons nominated by the consultants shall visit Hong Kong for five working days in the Autumn of 1986, before the commencement of the second phase of the assessment, for technical discussions and to aquaint themselves with any residual problems.
(ii) Following the visit referred to in (i) above, the provision by the HKG of the information referred to in paragraph 4.2.3 and the provision of any information identified as needed during the liaison process referred to in (i) above, the initial accident assessment shall be extended and refined in a second phase, using such additional information as has been supplied. Whilst all reasonable endeavours will be exercised to ensure the quality and accuracy of the reports generated in this second phase, they can only reflect the quality and accuracy of the information and data supplied by the HKG and the resources made available in the proposal. Within these constraints the second phase shall consist of:-
(a)
(b)
a brief general discussion of reactor accident risk assessment methods.
a revised assessment of release category probabilities. This study shall be limited in scope to the assessment of those modifications to the assignments of release category probabilities made in earlier studies of plant in Europe and the USA as, in the judgement of the consultants, are warranted by comparisons between the cardinal safety-related features of the Daya Bay design and of other designs (to the extent rendered practicable by the provision of information on the Daya Bay design by the HKG).
(c) a review of the physical phenomena which may occur during the
period between the onset of serious degradation of the core of the reactor and a breach of the containment boundary, and which are relevant to the timing and mode of any release of radioactivity. This study shall be limited in scope to the consideration of published work in this area (including evidence submitted to the Sizewell 'B' Public Inquiry and the report of that Inquiry if published before 1 January 1987) and to the supply of a reasoned justification for any modifications to the conclusions of earlier studies which may, in the