GRS 1600
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING
CONFIDENTIAL
Hele 160!!..
TO DESKBY 03093OZ FCO
TELNO 1574
OF 020804Z SEPTEMBER 86
RECEIVED IN A
2 SEP 1986
INFO DESKBY 03010OZ HONG KONG
525
TOP COPY Q_DIST ?
FROM GOVERNOR
$513 516
MY TELNOS 161-3 AND 165 TO HONG KONG AND HONG KONG TELNOS 210, 211,
213 (NOT TO FCO): GOVERNOR'S MEETINGS WITH ZHOU NAN AND JI PENG FEI
ON 1 SEPTEMBER: DAYA BAY
1. I RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH ZHOU NAN, MAKING TWO GENERAL POINTS:
(A) THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN ABOUT DAYA BAY IN HONG KONG. ALTHOUGH
SOME MIGHT HAVE A POLITICAL ELEMENT, MOST WS GENUINE. WE WELCOMED
THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO ALLAY THESE CONCERNS.
THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUING NEED FOR REASSURANCE SINCE CONCERN WOULD
ARISE AGAIN WHENEVER THERE WAS A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN THE WORLD. IT
WOULD ALSO BE A SENSITIVE TIME WHEN THE DAYA BAY PLANT WAS
COMMISSIONED.
(B) REFERRED TO THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE HKG AND MEMBERS OF LEGCO
TO ASSEMBLE INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR PLANTS AND SAFETY AND MAKE IT
AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE IN HONG KONG. ON 30 AUGUST LEGCO MEMBERS HAD
PUBLISHED THEIR REPORT WITH A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS. I UNDERSTOOD
IT WAS PROPOSED THAT THEY BE INVITED TO PEKING TO DISCUSS THE
REPORT. I RECOMMENDED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONSIDER
CAREFULLY THESE OBSERVATIONS. EVERY EFFORT MADE TO REASSURE PEOPLE
IN HONG KONG WOULD ASSIST STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. AS THE
AMBASSADOR HAD ALREDY EXPLAINED WE WISHED TO POSTPONE THE SIGNING OF
THE CONTRACT SO THAT HONG KONG PEOPLE COULD NOT CLAIM THAT DECISIONS
HAD BEEN MADE BEFORE THEY HAD HAD A CHANCE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS.
2. ZHOU NAN MADE 5 POINTS IN RESPONSE:
(A) HE UNDERSTOOD PEOPLE'S CONCERN OVER DAYA BAY. HE AGREED THE
VAST MAJORITY OF THESE CONCERNS WERE REASONABLE. BUT HE WAS GLAD TO NOTE THAT WE RECOGNISED THAT A MINORITY OF PEOPLE HAD THEIR OWN
POLITICAL PURPOSE.
(B) THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON ITS INTENTION TO BUILD THE
NUCLEAR POWER STATION ON DAYA BAY HAD NOT CHANGED AND COULD NOT
CHANGE. HU YAOBANG AND MRS THATCHER HAD EXPRESSED IDENTICAL VIEWS ON
THIS QUESTION IN JUNE.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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