•
X
DSR 11C
5.
Such
a
would of
course
have ma jor
with
the
step
for terms of our
implications, in terms
relationships
Chinese and French governments, as well
commercial interests.
>
There would no
as for British
doubt be wider
(in this country
s7of
consequences too in terms of domestic perceptions of the
Government's attitude to nuclear power.
6.
Our immediate response to the Governor's concerns
to
the
continue providing the
Hong Kong
fullest
Government
in its
must, I suggest, be to
possible support
present difficult position. We must demonstrate to them,
and enable them to demonstrate to a nervous and volatile
population, that we are aware of our
towards the community; that we are
responsibilities
fully communicating
and
enterprises
local anxieties to the governments
concerned; and that all possible is being done to inform
and reassure Hong Kong people.
7.
aware of the
The planned series of briefings and consultations
should help make Hong Kong people better
facts regarding reactor safety. But reactions to nuclear
power are not entirely rational, and it would be wrong to
under-estimate
the
depth of public Last week)
feeling.
The
Governor has suggested that the debate on the adjournment
could in the Legislative Council may well not be the end of the
matter: Before the LEGCO session finishes at the end of
could be calls July there
further debate on a
motion to the effect that
for
no nuclear plant should
be
built
So
close
to
Hong
Kong
and that
the
Chinese