SECRET
B
5.
At the end of last week the Governor's assessment
(Hong Kong telno 2132) was that with few exceptions earlier support for Hong Kong involvement in the project had turned
to opposition. He expressed the view that after the LegCo
debate on the
the adjournment scheduled for 16 July, to be
devoted to Daya Bay, we should be fortunate to get through
the rest of the Legco session, which continues until the
end of July, without a further debate. This could be on а
motion expressing the view that the Chinese Government
should be asked to move the plant (or, possibly, to convert
it to a thermal station).
6. On 4 July, however, UMELCO decided to mount their own
investigation into the safety aspects of
independent
nuclear power.
I assume (although I am seeking the
Governor's confirmation of this point) that the possibility
of an early hostile motion in Legco has therefore receded.
We may have a breathing space in which more rational attitudes can reassert themselves: but this is by no means
certain.
7.
It would nonetheless be as well to consider what some
of the implications would be if, sooner or later, such a
motion was to be tabled and adopted in LegCo. It would present the Hong Kong Government and ourselves with a very difficult prospect. Depending on the exact terms of the
motion the Governor might well argue strongly that the only
tenable position for the HKG would be for official members
of LegCo to associate themselves with such a motion.
8. Whatever the exact position adopted by officials, the implications of such a motion for UK/Hong Kong relations
could be serious. Unless we were seen to be ready to
protect Hong Kong's
Hong Kong's interests, we could face the charge
that we were disregarding the fears of the Hong Kong people, motivated only by concerns of commercial gain and
desire to maintain good relations
good relations with China. But
our