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B
5.
At the end of last week the Governor's assessment (Hong Kong telno 2132) was that with few exceptions earlier support for Hong Kong involvement in the project had turned to opposition. He expressed the view that after the LegCo debate on the adjournment scheduled for 16 July, to be devoted to Daya Bay, we should be fortunate to get through the rest of the Legco session, which continues until the end of July, without a further debate. This could be on a motion expressing the view that the Chinese Government should be asked to move the plant (or, possibly, to convert it to a thermal station).
6. On 4 July, however, UMELCO decided to mount their own investigation into the safety aspects of
independent
nuclear power.
I assume (although I am seeking the Governor's confirmation of this point) that the possibility of an early hostile motion in Legco has therefore receded.
We may have a breathing space in which more rational attitudes can reassert themselves: but this is by no means
certain.
7.
It would nonetheless be as well to consider what some
of the
the implications would be if, sooner or later, such a motion was to be tabled and adopted in LegCo. It would present the Hong Kong Government and ourselves with a very difficult prospect. Depending on the exact terms of the motion the Governor might well argue strongly that the only tenable position for the HKG would be for official members of LegCo to associate themselves with such a motion.
8. Whatever the exact position adopted by officials, the implications of such a motion for UK/Hong Kong relations could be serious. Unless we were seen to be ready to protect Hong Kong's interests, we could face the charge that we were disregarding the fears of the Hong Kong people, motivated only by concerns
by concerns of commercial gain and our desire to maintain good relations with China.
But
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