3. AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY I INTERVENED TO THANK SONG JIAN FOR HIS REMARKS ABOUT DAYA BAY. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR, AS I WAS CONFIDENT MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE WAS, THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSED NOT TO STOP THE PROJECT. I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR ABOUT THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE IAEA AND WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY. SPEAKING FRANKLY I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HMG HAD A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. ON THE ONE HAND WE FIRMLY SUPPORTED BRITISH COMPANIES' EFFORTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROJECT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAD NO DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE NUCLEAR PART OF THE PROJECT. WE WERE SEEN BY SOME PEOPLE IN HONG KONG AS BEING THEREFORE IRRESPONSIBLE. THERE HAD ALWAYS BEEN CONCERN IN HONG KONG AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS. AS SONG JIAN HAD POINTED OUT, THIS CONCERN HAD NOW BECOME MUCH MORE WIDESPREAD SINCE CHERNOBYL. IT WAS, OF COURSE, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO THE NECESSARY PUBLICITY TO REASSURE PEOPLE IN HONG KONG. BUT IN THIS THEY REQUIRED THE FULLEST POSSIBLE CO- OPERATION FROM THE CHINESE. THE PROJECT WAS ENTIRELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY AND UNDER THE CONTROL OF CHINA. ITS LIFE WOULD EXTEND WELL BEYOND 1997. WE THEREFORE HOPED THAT PRACTICAL STEPS COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN CHINA. IN PARTICULAR, THE NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRAT- ION NEEDED THE NECESSARY RESOURCES IN FUNDING AND IN TRAINED MAN- POWER TO MAKE IT AN EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION. I HOPED THAT THE SSTC COULD EXERCISE ITS INFLUENCE.
4. SONG JIAN THANKED ME FOR THESE REMARKS. HE SAID THAT THE NSA CAME UNDER THE SSTC AND IT WAS WORKING VERY HARD BOTH ON TRAINING OF PERSONNEL AND ON A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY. FOLLOWING CHERNOBYL, THE NSA HAD WRITTEN A REPORT TO THE STATE COUNCIL PARTICULARLY STRESSING THE NEED FOR SAFETY MEASURES IN RESPECT OF DAYA BAY. THE CHINESE WERE PREPARED TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR SAFETY AND TO SEE IF THEY COULD ADOPT FURTHER MEASURES TO REASSURE THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. HE HOPED THAT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS WOULD AGREE TO CO-OPERATE IN THIS WAY. FOLLOWING SUCH DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS REACHED ON THE FURTHER MEASURES TO BE TAKN, THE CHINESE WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD ALSO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT. THIS WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF PRACTICAL CO-OPERATION.
5. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION LATER IN THE EVENING ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT BE CONSIDERING CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN NUCLEAR POWER, SONG JIAN SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO SUCH PLANS. ARKHIPOV HAD PROPOSED CO-OPERATION IN THIS FIELD DURING HIS VISIT SOME MONTHS AGO. BUT THE CHINESE RESPONSE HAD BEEN FAR FROM ENTHUSIASTIC. EVEN BEFORE CHERNOBYL IN ANY CASE THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE HAD NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY GOOD. THE CHINESE HAD DECIDED TO CO-OPERATE WITH FRANCE PARTLY BECAUSE THE FRENCH ATTITUDE WAS THAT THE CUSTOMER ALWAYS CAME FIRST. THE SOVIET PHILOSOPHY WAS 'BIG BROTHERS COME FIRST'. THE CHINESE HAD AGREED TO SEND A DELE- GATION TO STUDY SOVIET NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, SONE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY HAD ACTUALLY GONE. SONG ADDED THAT HE SYMPATHISED WITH THE SOVIETS IN THEIR DISASTER BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A TEMPORARY ONE. HE BELIEVED THAT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE
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CONFIDENTIAL
I MASTERED