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(B) SAFETY OF INSTALLATIONS:
(C)
(1)
(11)
WAS THERE ANY NEED FOR AGREED EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR
NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS (IN ADDITION TO ALARA AND THE
BASIC SAFETY STANDARDS).
MIGHT THERE BE SOME HARMONISATION OF METHODS OF RISK
ASSESSMENT, DESIGN CODES, OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES.
INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM (IRS):
THIS HAD JUST BEEN EXTENDED TO THE IAEA. BEING SLOW THIS
WAS SUPPLEMENTARY, NOT ALTERNATIVE, TO THE PROPOSED
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. IT SHOULD NOW BE MADE OBLIGATORY.
(D) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
MORE COMMUNITY RESEARCH WAS NECESSARY ON:
(A) PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT.
(B) STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF SERIOUS ACCIDENTS.
(C) BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIOACTIVITY (E.G. VIA
CONTAMINATED FOOD).
(E) CRISIS PROCEDURES.
APART FROM THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ALREADY MENTIONED
THERE MIGHT BE:
(A) AGREED CONTROLS IMPOSED BY MEMBER STATES IN EVENT OF
AN ACCIDENT.
(B) PROCEDURES TO ENABLE MORE RAPID EC ACTION IN THE
EVENT OF A CRISIS, E.G. ON OUR LINKS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.
(C) SOME SYSTEM FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BY MEMBER STATES
(E.G. AS IN INFCIRC 310) IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT.
(F) CIVIL CONTINGENCIES:
THE COMMISSION FELT THAT THE EXISTING OECD AND OTHER
CONVENTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT YIELDED MUCH IN THE
WAY OF HARMONISATION. MIGHT THE EC TRY TO DO MORE?
(G) INTERNATIONAL ACTION:
(1)
(11)
(111)
WORKING TO MAKE IRS OBLIGATORY (SEE ABOVE).
MAINTAIN EFFORTS TO GET USSR TO DISGORGE MORE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT IN PARTICULAR
ON THE DECONTAMINATION OF CHERNOBYL AND
SURROUNDING AREAS.
COMMISSION PARTICIPATION AT VIENNA MEETING IN
DETAILED EVALUATION OF THE ACCIDENT.
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13.