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c) the Committee believed that the Americans were either putting up a smokescreen for reasons unknown; that the situation resulted from inter-Departmental conflicts within the Administration; or that the Americans were particularly anxious that the Committee should not visit the Philippines.
d) the shape of the final programme would of course
depend upon Lehman's reaction to Roger's letter of 12 September but the Committee were pretty much resigned to dropping the Philippines. In response to a question he confirmed that they intended spending no more than two days in Diego Garcia. They knew that no US carriers would be in the area at the time (although I now understand this may not be so).
Rogers also said that Harris had cabled the Committee's response to Washington and the ball was clearly understood to be in Lehman's court. Having now seen the correspondence I am surprised that Rogers has not sought to resolve the specific outstanding uncertainties, not least about the extent to which the Americans are prepared to provide transportation. I understand you are drafting a telegram to Washington; I hope the Embassy can ensure that all the loose ends are tied up in Lehman's response. Time is getting
short.
4. Rogers confirmed that no action was required from us in the meantime and that present arrangements could remain on ice. I will in fact let Manila know the position. MED will wish to give some thought to the Committee's additional time in Oman but I would suggest taking no action until the overall programme is clearer. If the Committee do stay on in Oman, the Embassy will almost certainly have to take over the arrangements for the two additional days.
5.
I will deal with the FRG Navy visit separately.
facon
PJ Bacon
Parliamentary Relations Unit
17 September 1986
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