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21.
The Secretary of State noted that there was an element of
paradox in the desire of Hong Kong people to be assured both about
continuity and about flexibility. Flexibility might be used
adversely by the PRC after 1997. The Governor agreed that this was
some in Hong Kong were saying in effect that the provisions they most wanted in
the Basic Law should be entrenched; the ones
they might want to change should not be.
So:
22.
Mr Oswald Cheung noted that the Joint Declaration specified
that Hong Kong should have a high degree of autonomy. This required
some "highly cantankerous chaps" in the legislature.
noted that it seemed possible to secure this element even by
indirect elections.
The Governor
23.
The Secretary of State said he had heard some useful views on
a number of issues. He would try to take his dialogue with Wu
forward in New York about what developments in the next stage would
be acceptable in Hong Kong. He hoped he would not have to hand over
too much paper. The Governor noted that at the Brussels meeting,
papers had been made ready, but it had been left to the Secretary of
State to decide in the light of his discussions whether these should
be handed over to Wu by him, to Ambassador Ke by Dr Wilson, or not
at all.
24.
It
Miss Dunn commented that she thought the handing over of
papers was a most useful means of influencing Chinese thinking.
gave them something they could study at length, after which informal
discussion could take place. This was all the more important since
they were not getting a cohesive view of the Hong Kong reality from
the BLDC discussions. The Secretary of State noted that during the
drafting of the Joint Declaration, the Chinese had shown sensitivity
about the length of the final document. Dr Wilson noted that there
had been no sign of resistance yet to papers about constitutional development. He agreed with Miss Dunn that the exchanges hitherto,
carried out at a measured pace and without publicity, had been most
helpful.
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