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(a)
(b)
(c)
(a)
(e)
(£)
(g)
CONCLUSION
Our general conclusions are as follows:
as with the Research Department paper this paper too has
left on one side consideration of the future of the
Falklands, Gibraltar and Hong Kong;
we have also assumed that, for varying reasons, the status
of BAT, BIOT and the Falkland Island Depedencies is for the
moment frozen;
it seems inevitable for the foreseeable future that the
status of Pitcairn, St Helena and St Helena Dependencies
should remain as at present. It is possible that one or all
of them could be integrated into the UK at some point in the
future but such policies would involve considerable risks
and difficulties in the short and medium term and are not at
present recommended as workable options;
however further movement towards independence should be
possible for the six territories in the Caribbean and Bermuda, the US being the ultimate guarantor of security.
It is difficult to predict exactly by what date this might be achieved but it should not be impossible to bring all of
them to independence by the year 2000, and Bermuda some time
before then;
a programme of action designed to bring this about, as
described in Section VI should be costed in detail and set
in hand; the initial costings suggest that the measures are
affordable;
talks should be initiated with the US designed to bring them
into our confidence over our plans for the six dependencies,
to start defining the type of security umbrella that might
be provided by them and to consider other ways of encouraging US assistance to the territories. This approach will call for careful timing. The tenor of our approach
to the Americans should be firm but fall short of presenting them with a fait accompli;
the leaders of the dependencies in question should also be told of our intentions in due course, but the timing will also call for careful political judgement;
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