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of them can be assumed in the longer term to be immune from outside aggression, internal subversion, the consequences of organised crime or inadvertent involvement in regional
disputes. It is true that the Grenada episode demonstrated
that the mere fact of independence does not preclude small states from making political and security demands on larger
states. But in the case of independent territories, far less of the responsibility falls on HMG which has then
choices open to it.
2.1.2
Cost. This has in the past been modest, but there
is a change in the offing (see Section IV below). So far
the cost to HMG of maintaining roads, telecommunications,
airports etc, even in popular tourist resorts, has not increased markedly. International standards, expectations and the demands of internal security are however rising, and with them likely demands on the public purse for sophisticated infrastructure expenditure. Already there have been examples (e.g. a £6m airport in the Turks and Caicos) of HMG having to spend significant sums to provide the facilities necessary to attract private investment. This is likely to be the start of a trend.
2.2 Changes since 1973 going against disengagement
2.2.1
Strategic Aspects. The US has invested heavily in new defence facilities on some of the dependencies (BIOT in particular). It would not welcome any change of status that
put access to its defence facilities at risk.
2.2.2
East/West Aspects. Growing (especially US)
concern for the defence of Western interests outside the
NATO area, and consciousness of the vulnerability of independent small states to Soviet, Cuban-backed or other
subversion, has strengthened their reluctance to see further proliferation of small, independent states unable to provide for their own defence; this concern is felt in spite of any difficulty HMG might have in deterring a threat or mounting a rescue operation alone.
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