CONFIDENTIAL
THE FUTURE OF THE REMAINING DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
I
INTRODUCTION
1 When the Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) team made their
study of the future of the dependent territories in 1973 it was
against the background of the remaining territories' reluctance to move to independence. Nine of the territories then examined have since achieved independence. For the rest, 15 in all (shown on map at Annex A), the underlying conclusion of the PAR study that "the government should relieve itself of direct responsibility for as many as possible of the remaining territories" continues to form the basis of policy towards the dependencies. Yet no active policy of disengagement has been pursued in the intervening years and indeed in that time the local governments of some of the dependencies have become lethargic (and in certain cases corrupt) at some cost to HMG. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of current policy in relation to the remaining dependencies. It takes in a range of considerations rather different from those of the Research Department analysis on possible options (being submitted together with this paper), which it is designed to complement, and reaches slightly different conclusions. For reasons more fully explained in paras 4-5 below, it focusses on the nine dependencies in the Caribbean, Bermuda, St Helena and its
Dependencies and Pitcairn.
II RECENT CHANGES
2
Pressures since 1973 have not been uniform. In some cases they have reinforced the policy of disengagement recommended by the PAR study; in other cases they have run in the opposite direction.
2.1
Changes Since 1973 Favouring Disengagement 2.1.1
Security. The Falklands episode demonstrated the potentially high political and financial cost (not to mention the cost in terms of loss of life) of defending a dependent territory. Fortunately there are no comparable territorial claims on the other dependencies. Equally none
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CONFIDENTIAL