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42. However, if nothing is done there is
a) the prospect of retaining long term responsibility for the
dependent territories whose nuisance value to the UK inay increase with time, if the problem of responsibility without effective power is not resolved;
b) the risk that independence will become more, rather than
less difficult to grant;
c) the open-ended nature of our present security/defence
commitment to the Caribbean dependent territories
43. If it is the view of Ministers that a policy of promoting
independence for the residual Caribbean dependent territories (or
any other variant of their present status) is neither desirable nor
feasible in the short-term, and this view is shared by their
populations, consideration should be given to means of ensuring that
HMG reserves sufficient powers to maintain orderly, effective and
economic administration in the territories.
44. The 1973 review also suggested that BAT BIOT, South Georgia and South Sandwich and St Helena/Ascension Island were among territories
which HMG would definitely not wish to become independent within the
time scale, if only because of UK interests. The recent review of
policy towards BAT and South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands did not consider independence as an option for these territories. Policy on BIOT has also been fully explored and Ministers have opted
for maintenance of the status quo. These territories will thus
remain territories which the UK because of UK interests or treaty obligations would wish to remain as dependent territories of the UK
for the foreseeable future. In any case decisions on the future of
these territories can be taken with reference to UK (or allied
interests) alone, rather than to those of any resident population As for Pitcairn and Tristan da Cunha, maintenance of the status quo
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