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CONFIDENTIAL
(g) the type of organisation necessary to oversee the economic
development of the territories prior to independence will
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
need careful attention;
it will be necessary to bring the US into our confidence over any plans agreed for the six dependent territories. Such an approach will call for careful timing. We should be firm with the Americans but avoid presenting them with a
fait accompli;
tactics for broaching the issue of independence will need to be carefully tailored to the situation in each territory; HMG should not block a federal structure post independence
if this seemed on the cards, and should encourage the
territories in the Caribbean to cooperate more. In practice this is however likely to be limited to economic and
security matters;
in Whitehall a coordinating committee should be established possibly located in the Cabinet Office.
40 If these conclusions are not accepted there will be little alternative but to persist with dependence. It is possible that some territories (perhaps particularly Bermuda) will press for independence even without our encouragement. Drift will not ease our problems and they could well accumulate over the long term.
ΧΙ
41
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
We recommend:
a)
b)
C)
d)
that the Governors of the Caribbean dependencies and Bermuda, and the Development Division, be invited to
comment on the conclusions of this paper.
that this paper and their comments should be discussed
further at the Governors conference in January 1987
under the chairmanship of Lady Young.
that the Embassy in Washington be invited to comment on likely US reactions.
that in the meantime the ODA and the FCO (consulting the
above as necessary) prepare and cost a programme of work designed to bring the six territories to independence by
the year 2000.
CONFIDENTIAL
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