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costing of the measures needed to bring the islands to
independence. These should be weighed against the likely long
term savings when, as the result of independence, our obligations
will become discretionary and ought to be on a reducing curve.
VIII POLICY PRESENTATION AND TIMING
36 Such a policy would mark a change of emphasis from the present one of doing no more than encouraging the process of
independence. Indeed in recent years there has been little evidence of anything quite so active. In the early stages there is probably no need and possibly little value in announcing a change of tempo. The political and economic aspects of the suggested measures represent, initially, little more than an acceleration of the work already under way in the dependent territories and should not attract attention or give rise to criticism. But this cannot last for long if we are to avoid merely inviting the desire for more comfortable dependence. the economic prospects and plans are clearer the political education should begin. Indeed it should be prepared for in parallel with economic planning. The timing of our discussions with the US will also be important and will be influenced by the following factors among others:
Once
Our intentions are more likely to become known publicly from the dependent territories than from the US administration. This suggests that the first approach should be to the US. A leak from the US would however do considerable damage in the territories as well as in the UK and strict secrecy would need to be enjoined.
An early approach to the US gives more time to convince them of the need for speeding up existing policy and to agree further cooperation over alternative security
arrangements.
In the case of some of the dependencies (particularly Bermuda and Montserrat where a degree of cooperation could be expected) an early approach could have its advantages. programme of action could then be implemented with the full understanding of the leaders.
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