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would put pressure on us not to do so. The fact is that a rundown in our security responsibilities without US acquiescence (and preferably cooperation) will be detrimental to UK interests because the Americans are likely to regard it as damaging to theirs. The real extra burden the US would be called upon to
The assume would, for them, be very small - almost negligible. task for HMG will be to convince them of this and of the thesis that a reduction in the UK presence can be accomplished in ways which cause them minimal damage.
23 The most plausible way of putting our case to the US would be to point out that independence of the remaining territories is simply a continuation of long established policy that we do not
intend to reverse;
that we continue to contribute to regional security in other ways (Belize, the West Indian Guardship (WIGS) and assistance to the Regional Security System (RSS))
that we would intend only to disengage from the first two of these commitments as and when the security situation
permits
in the meantime our support for the RSS would continue and, in order to strengthen security in the region, the dependent territories should be brought more actively into the RSS in preparation for their eventual independence, whenever they are ready for this.
Put this way, we should be able to link independence with a responsible UK attitude to security in the eyes of the US Administration while putting a cap on our otherwise open-ended
and indefinite liability. At the outset we should avoid appearing too rigid over timescales and deadlines (which would probably be unrealistic anyway); when the policy is fairly established, we would be able to begin to fix timetables.
24 There are always dangers in transition. Dependent status, so long as it is seen to be supported by the mass of the population, and while the UK guarantee remains credible, attracts investors, increases stability and helps deter external threats.
The "British" label is worth money in itself to the local
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