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these two options used selectively in Tristan da Cunha
and/or Ascension, while St Helena maintains its dependent
status.
None of these options is however feasible before either 1997 (because of Hong Kong) or before the Falklands problem has been resolved (whichever is the later).
19 Finally, Pitcairn.
very small.
It has few facilities (eg no good harbour) and very few inhabitants. It costs very little per annum (£50,000 in aid in 1985/86). It is regarded as being of potential scientific value. It seems nonsense seriously to contemplate complex constitutional change leading to the paraphernalia of statehood. The liabilities to the UK associated with the continuing dependence of a territory are remote though not non existent. The Soviet Union seems unlikely to make it a target of subversion though they might become interested in the fishing round it (which could lead to complications). It could be argued that the
continuing existence of a colony in the South Pacific, which gives HMG a locus in regional policy, also makes it more difficult to shed development aid commitments in the region.
This hardly seems a prevailing argument. Decisions on ODA allocations to the South Pacific will be taken, if they are necessary, irrespective of the status of Pitcairn which seems destined to remain indefinitely that of a dependent territory.
It is very isolated in the Pacific and
VI
THE REQUIREMENTS UNDERLYING FURTHER MOVES TOWARDS
INDEPENDENCE FOR THE CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES AND BERMUDA
20 The rest of the paper will be concerned with the six territories in the Caribbean and Bermuda. Moving these islands to independence (however slowly) entails three broad
requirements:
the continuing provision of defence; and in the event of independence the provision of alternative security
arrangements
continuing to develop the economies with the aim in the long
term of reducing reliance on British government finance
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