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staying in Belize because of the need for continuing US support over the Falklands), but as the case of Belize shows this can be quite costly year on year. If the need for trade-offs with the United States is considered an important factor, this may be a valid foreign policy reason, but should be recognised for what it is. Extraneous considerations apart therefore the long term aim in the case of the Caribbean territories and Bermuda should be greater rather than less movement towards independence. There is however one general rider. Such a policy should not be regarded as precluding, if this becomes necessary, temporary suspension of
local powers.
If this option needs to be exercised, as in the case of the TCI, then action needs to be timely and decisive and should be followed by a concerted plan to resume movement towards
independence.
16 In the Caribbean the dependent territories could be moved to independence either as completely separate economic units or by encouraging regional collaboration. The PAR study concluded that "the disruptive effects of local chauvinism and HMG's consequent lack of success with federation in the past suggest that this sort of effort could be counter productive". Experience since
1973 has done little to change this conclusion. Nonetheless
examples of small scale federation do exist (eg Trinidad and Tobago; Antigua and Barbuda). Moreover in recent years a greater readiness on the part of Eastern Caribbean states to recognise
the advantages of cooperation has become evident. The UK should be active in ensuring that this mood communicates itself to the
dependent territories. Regional cooperative arrangements embracing the dependent territories could bring both military and
economic benefits. Militarily the Regional Security System
(RSS), currently including a number of ex-dependencies in the
Eastern Caribbean, could be expanded to involve the newly
independent states (see paras 21-24 for more detail). Economically increased inter-dependence could be achieved by
drawing on the experience of CARICOM and the East Caribbean Common Market, and by promoting new initiatives, e.g. in tourism and investment, both promoted regionally. With time such action might inspire a greater local willingness to cooperate
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