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11 In sum the current costs of the ten territories are relatively modest. These costs could however rise for the
following reasons:
(i) annual costs necessary to deter any threat to stability
are likely to increase and, in addition, we may find ourselves under increased pressure to provide more development assistance in response to rising
expectations;
(ii) major costs could be incurred in response to a
significant threat; this eventuality is unlikely but
could be very expensive.
There is therefore a trade off between the unquantifiable, but probably moderate, annual costs of continuing dependence versus the likelihood of the higher costs of bringing the territories to independence followed by a release from the absolute (and possibly very costly) obligations of the colonial power - to be replaced by a situation where we can excuse discretion. In this context the costs at (ii), if they did become necessary, would be
far smaller for the US than the UK particularly in those
territories near to the US mainland. In the following sections
we consider alternatives to the present arrangements.
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POSSIBLE FORMULAE FOR CHANGE
The options for change outlined in Section IV of the Research Department paper fall into two general categories.
There are those involving continued dependence on the UK where
the choice lies between maintaining the present dependent status or even greater dependence/integration; and there are those involving a loosening of the ties with the UK where the choice is
between transferring ownership to another country, opting for a
different (looser) form of dependence on the UK, arranging for
increased dependence on another regional power, on the UN or on a
regional grouping, promoting complete independence, or (as an extreme measure) abandonment ie HMG's departure without the
assent of the population. The international climate of opinion
on decolonisation issues is, as has been noted (para 2.2.4),
relaxed.
But it still assumes that the ultimate destiny of small
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