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campaigns to stamp it out. They have met with some success, but the problem is far from solved. In addition, such
campaigns can tend to stifle initiative. It is not always easy to tell between what is a daring initiative and what is
an economic offence.
15. Lastly, the Chinese bureaucracy itself deserves a mention
as a serious obstacle to reform. A good example is that of
Shandong. Some factory managers there have even been calling
for the reimposition of central control. They found that the
local authorities to whom power had been devolved interfered
more and were less competent than the central officials in Peking.
Outlook
16. The easy days for economic reform are over. Much of the
initial success both in agriculture and industry was achieved
through the application of material incentives and through the
taking up of slack. This cannot be repeated. The Chinese are
now reaching the stage where they have to grapple with the real structural problems of the economy, particularly in the urban areas. These are proving much less tractable than the questions
they have addressed hitherto. Their experience in 1985 with
price reform and the operation of economic levers was not a
happy one and they have been forced to take things more slowly
than they originally intended. This is not necessarily a bad
thing. The Chinese are breaking new ground and steady cautious progress is more likely to produce lasting results than the
stop-go of experimentation followed by "readjustment".
17. Political stability with the reformist group in power is of course a prerequisite. While Deng Xiaoping remains in charge
this is as guaranteed as much as anything can be in politics. The
outlook is not so certain thereafter. His successors will need
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