SECRET
If we
bound by the terms of the Joint Declaration to consult. sought to go ahead without consultation with the Chinese the
objective of a smooth transition, brought about in cooperation with
China, could not be achieved.
14. If the Chief Executive (Designate) whom we would have appointea
for the period immediately before 1997 is to move into ortice when
the Hong Kong SAR comes into being, then the candidate must be one
acceptable to both the British and Chinese Governments and appointed
after consultation between them. A candidate unacceptable to China
would be replaced on 1 July 1997: the object of the exercise would
not have been attained.
15 But it would be incorrect to conclude that this consultation
would concede to China a dangerous degree of influence over Hong
Kong before 1997. HMG would retain full responsibility for the
administration of Hong Kong up to 30 June 1997, as the Joint Declaration provides. We would retain control over the process by
which the Chief Executive (Designate) was appointed. The delegation
or devolution of powers to him could be effected gradually. They
Would, in the last resort, be resumed if the need arose, either
because of his inadequacy or because of external factors. There
could be no question of HMG agreeing to appoint a Chief Executive
(Designate) favoured by the Chinese if he was unacceptable to ourselves or to the people of Hong Kong. In fact we would acquire
enhanced influence over the course of events in the Hong Kong SAR
after 1997 because the creation of the office of Chief Executive and
the nomination of the incumbent would have been a matter for
consultation between the Chinese and ourselves.
Consequential Issues
16. A number of consequential issues are examined in the Annex to
this paper.
Ministers will wish to note the implications of what is
proposed: but these do not require Ministerial decision at this
stage. Such decisions could only be taken once the general concept
has been explained to the Chinese and they have been drawn into
SECRET
-5-