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11.

OPTION (B) MIGHT INVOLVE ACTION IN TWO STAGES BEFORE

1997. THE POST OF DEPUTY GOVERNOR COULD BE CREATED AND FILLED

WITHIN THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY 1990S. THE POWERS

WHICH WILL BE EXERCISED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AFTER 1997 WOULD

BE GRADUALLY DELEGATED OR DEVOLVED TO THE OCCUPANT OF THE POST

FROM THE GOVERNOR. THE GOVERNOR WOULD RETAIN ULTIMATE AUTHORITY AND SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF HMG, FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY. NEARER 1997 IT WOULD BE FILLED BY A PERSON, SELECTED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE CHINESE,

WHO COULD BRIDGE THE GAP AND HOLD OFFICE AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE AFTER

1997.

12.

OPTION (B) WOULD HELP TO ENSURE CONVERGENCE WITH THE

POST-1997 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND MEET THE NEED FOR A SMOOTH

TRANSITION. IT WOULD INDICATE TO THE HONG KONG PEOPLE IN ADVANCE

THE WAY IN WHICH THE TRANSITION WOULD BE HANDLED. IT WOULD

REDUCE APPREHENSION. IN PARTICULAR IT WOULD ENABLE THE IMPORTANT

MIDDLE AND MANAGERIAL CLASSES TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND EFFECT

OF THE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD BE IN

PROSPECT.

13.

IT

THE CREATION OF A POST OF DEPUTY GOVERNOR WOULD PROVIDE

TIME AND A FOCUS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

WHICH MUST BE MADE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRANSITION.

WOULD ACCUSTOM MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, THE LEGISLATIVE

COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, FIRST TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE

POST AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE PERSON OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

(DESIGNATE) BEFORE THE TRANSITION OF GOVERNMENT TOOK PLACE. IT

WOULD GIVE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE (DESIGNATE) TIME TO UNDERSTAND THE

PROCESSES OF GOVERNING AND TO ESTABLISH HIS AUTHORITY. THERE IS

ALSO LIKELY TO BE AN INCREASING NEED IN THE MORE POLITICAL

ATMOSPHERE OF THE 1990S FOR SOMEONE TO TAKE A LEAD IN PRESENTING

GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND MORE GENERALLY IN THE PUBLIC AREA. THE GOVERNOR WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM

THIS ROLE.

14.0

IN PRINCIPLE THE ADVANTAGES OF OPTION (B) ARE CLEAR-CUT.

WE NEED HOWEVER TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR

RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA AND OUR OBJECTIVE OF SECURING THE MAXIMUM

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