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(iv) by 30 June 1997 the Chief Executive (Designate) should
exercise all the powers which he would exercise when the Hong
Kong SAR came into being. The remaining powers would be retained by the Governor (Annex paras 7-8):
who would
(v) the method of selection of the individual
bridge the change of sovereignty in 1997, but not of the
first Deputy Governor, would be determined in the light of discussion with the Chinese (Annex paras 9-10).
Initial Action
20. It is important that we should put our ideas to the Chinese
soon, before their present thinking about the first Chief Executive becomes firm and/or public. We have
have succeeded in establishing a
useful informal dialogue with them on issues relating to
constitutional development in Hong Kong and the drafting of the
Basic Law.
In the course of this dialogue the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary has passed to his Chinese counterpart a
series of short papers which have helped to guide discussion.
During the State Visit to China the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary also explained to his counterpart that we were giving
thought to the question of the Chief Executive: that we should avoid a Chief Executive (Designate) waiting in the wings; and that we would soon provide the Chinese with our detailed thoughts on this
issue.
21.
It is proposed that a further short paper should be prepared
for transmission to the Chinese, introducing the concept of the
creation of a government post for the Chief Executive (Designate) in
advance of 1997. This would be passed to the Chinese Foreign
Minister under cover of а personal message from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary. There will be opportunities for informal discussion of the paper when the British team for the Sino- British Joint Liaison Group (JLG) visits Peking for
(JLG) visits Peking for a meeting of the Group
in late November (although it is not intended that this should be
discussed in the JLG)
in the JLG) and when the Governor of Hong Kong goes to
Peking on other business in early December.
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