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someone to take a lead

in presenting government policies in Legislative Council and more generally in the public area. Governor will not be able to perform this role.

the

The

We

our

14. In principle the advantages of option (B) are clear-cut.

need however to consider carefully the implications for relationship with China and our objective of securing the maximum influence over developments in Hong Kong.

The Chinese Dimension

1.5.

The introduction of a Chief Executive (Designate) before 1997

could be achieved successfully only in agreement with the Chinese

Government. This would be not an abdication of responsibility but a practical necessity. Such modifications to the Hong Kong Government

structure would without doubt be "matters relating to the smooth

transfer of government" on which the two sides are bound by the

terms of the Joint Declaration to consult. We would need to explain

to the Chinese how we envisaged that the post would fit within the

Hong Kong Government structure, how the incumbent would be selected

and how powers would be progressively delegated to him. If we

sought to go ahead without consultation with the Chinese the

objective of a smooth transition, brought about in cooperation with

China, could not be achieved.

16.

Such consultation, if it led to agreement and to the

appointment of an individual who would bridge the change of

sovereignty in 1997, would offer us a valuable means of acquiring

enhanced influence over events after 1997, because the

because the first Chief

Executive would be a candidate acceptable to ourselves as well as to

the Chinese Government. It is true that as a quid pro quo we would

have conceded to the Chinese influence over an appointment made

before 1997. But the bargain would be in our favour. We would

retain full responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong up to

30 June 1997, as the Joint Declaration provides. We would retain

control over the process by which the candidate was appointed, both

in the early 1990s and nearer 1997. This formal power would give us

the means of resisting any attempt by the Chinese to impose on Hong Kong before 1997 a Chief Executive (Designate) who would not be

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