with British consulates overseas for British nationals also applied to BN(O)s.
Mrs Selina CHOW agreed that it should be made absolutely clear and beyond doubt that holders of the new travel document had the right of abode in Hong Kong. Provided that there would be an endorsement to this effect, she did not object to issuing the new document before 1997. She added that it was important to include holders of BN(O) passports in any reciprocal visa agreement that the future HK SAR Government might choose to enter into with other states. On the need to obtain a certificate of entry to the UK, she said that BDTCs and future BN(O)s should not be required to apply for one and should automatically enjoy the right of entry into the UK.
Speaking on the possibility of statelessness for ethnic minorities in Hong Kong, Mr Carl TONG welcomed the provisions in the future Order-in- Council to be made under the Hong Kong Bill that persons who might become stateless as a result of the Order, and children born after 1.7.97 to holders of the new British status, if they would otherwise be stateless, might acquire the British Overseas Citizenship (BOC). However, he pointed out that BOC was not transmissible by descent and there were no arrangements to prevent statelessness for children of BOCs. In addition, BN(O)s who were not Chinese nationals and had the right of abode in Hong Kong would then not be eligible for British consular protection in Hong Kong. He urged the Government to examine these questions and clarify them as soon as possible.
In reply, the Chief Secretary affirmed that under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, it was possible to make an endorsement on future BN(O) passports stating that the holder had the right of abode in Hong Kong. He said that the British Government had undertaken publicly and repeatedly that they would make every effort to explain the arrangements regarding the issue and use of BN(O) passports to third countries. In conclusion, he assured Members that the draft Order-in- Council, to be made within a year of the passage of the Hong Kong Bill, would be publicised in Hong Kong once it was introduced into the UK Parliament and there would be an
opportunity for Members to express their views should they wish to do so.
The Vietnamese Refugee Problem in Hong Kong
The Home Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons published a report on 18.4.85 entitled 'Refugees and Asylum, with Special Reference to the Vietnamese". The report recommended, inter alia, that family reunion criteria for Vietnamese refugees set down by the British Government should be relaxed, and that closed camps in Hong Kong should be abolished. The report referred to the possibility of Britain accepting a small share of those who were hard to settle and had spent years in camps in Hong Kong. It also mentioned that Hong Kong should accept for settlement a proportion of the ethnic Chinese in open camps.
The report attracted a lot of media coverage immediately after its publication. At the LegCo in-house meeting on 24.4.85, it was agreed that an adjournment debate should be held on the Vietnamese refugee problem in Hong Kong to enable Members to express their views.
Six Members participated in the adjournment debate on 15.5.85. They were Mr WONG Lam, Dr HỌ Kam-fai, Mr Allen LEE, Mrs Selina CHOW, Dr Henrietta IP and Mrs Rita FAN. All of them agreed that the closed camp policy was a necessary deterrent to discourage potential Vietnamese refugees from coming to Hong Kong and that it should be maintained. They also urged the UK Government to take the lead in accepting more refugees from Hong Kong.
Starting off the debate, Dr HO Kam-fai outlined the factual background of the problem. He said that although the rate of refugee arrivals had fallen, the rate of resettlement was dropping even faster. Hong Kong had not only been a place of first asylum but had also absorbed 14,500 displaced people from Indo-China since 1975. He welcomed the recommendation of the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee that the UK should relax the family reunion criteria for Vietnamese refugees, saying that this move would lead other countries to follow suit. Since Britain had a special responsibility towards Hong Kong, it was a most appropriate time for the UK to demonstrate its concern and
sincerity by taking steps to solve Hong Kong's refugee problem.
In his speech, Mr WONG Lam likened someone who avoided discussing the crux of the refugee problem and accused Hong Kong of adopting inhumane measures to a person sitting alone in a Rolls Royce limonsine and accusing the driver of an overloaded bus of not placing extra seats at the top of the bus to accommodate more passengers. Such accusation was neither helpful nor fair. What was needed was international assistance rendered through practical action.
Mr Allen LEE said that Hong Kong had done more than her share based on humanitarian or any other grounds. He took the opportunity to ask the question he was unable to ask in 1979, i.e. what was Hong Kong Government's policy towards Vietnamese refugees, what would be the long term implications, whether Hong Kong had to accept the rejects into its community and what was the solution? He also urged the British Government to show its special responsibility to Hong Kong by accepting a substantial number of Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong.
Supporting the closed camp policy for Vietnamese refugees, Mrs Selina CHOW pointed out the three major justifications. First, Hong Kong was the most receptive place of first asylum and international pressure was on Hong Kong to come up with some form of humane deterrent. Otherwise there was a real danger of a further decline of resettlement prospects of refugees. Secondly, it was justifiably feared that Hong Kong might be relied upon as a place of permanent resettlement. Thirdly, Hong Kong's treatment of Vietnamese refugees before the introduction of the policy was not in line with that of other Asian countries, most of which had been operating closed camps, nor was it consistent with Hong Kong's treatment of illegal immigrants from China. In the face of the only three realistic options, which were: repatriation, refusal to land and the closed camps, the last was the least inhumane. Although the policy was by no means a pleasant one, it was necessary and successful in reducing the number of arrivals. Unless and until the world could help Hong Kong solve the problem, Hong Kong could not afford to act otherwise.
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