CONFIDENTIAL
Ye
idsed
views.
Although Miss Tam was being briefed by the Hong
Kong Government, he was surprised that she sometimes took a
line at variance with what he believed to be HKG views:
this perplexed him, and might well mislead the Chinese side
as well.
4.
You and I discussed this point briefly. We agreed that
I should write to Mr Peirce in Hong Kong, suggesting that
the Hong Kong Government might wish to consider giving Mr
Lee slightly more comprehensive briefing if they thought that he was discreet enough to make diplomatic use of it.
5. Mr Lee's second theme was criticism of HMG and the HKG
for not fighting hard enough for Hong Kong's interests. An
An assumpton agreement had been achieved which gave Hong Kong the real here that there is a Commony accepted News of What i
best for the
in terms of Sork structure. Brwor
So.
for
hope of autonomy. But now HMG and the HKG were only concerned about bringing about convergence in a way which
caused the fewest waves in Peking. Mr Lee said rather
sadly that the people of Hong Kong needed leadership: they had to be helped. They were not accustomed to speaking up
themselves. HMG and the Hong Kong Government should
speak up strongly
strongly in Peking on their behalf.
Governments should also encourage the emergence of а more
outspoken political class. Almost all the Unofficials were
no more than yes men: they were only concerned not to rock
the boat. HMG and the HKG should bring forward politicians
of a more independent frame of mind, and should actively
encourage the rest to speak out on behalf of Hong Kong.
6.
The two
You and I agreed that I should summarise the main
points from our two conversations with Mr Lee in a letter
to Mr Peirce.
29 July 1986
Conten
CO Hum
Hong Kong Department
CONFIDENTIAL