PANN
3.
THERE APPEARS TO BE NO BASIS THEREFORE POR LI HOU'S
SUGGESTION THAT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED DURING
THE NEGOTIATIONS. COULD THERE BE ANY ELEMENT OF MISUNDERSTANDING
ON THE PART OF THE PRESS OR OF THE BLCC MEMBERS CONCERNED? IT
MIGHT BE WORTH CHECKING WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, IF THERE
WERE ANY WHO ARE CONTACTS OF YOURS.
4.
WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER LI'S DEFINITION OF
ACCOUNTABILITY WOULD IN FACT BE AN ACCEPTABLE ONE IF IT CAME TO
BE TRANSLATED INTO THE PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC LAW. THE POSITIVE
DEFINITION IN PARA 2(D) OF PIRST TUR, COMBINED WITH THE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS IN 2(A), SEEMS TO US GENERALLY ON THE RIGHT LINES,
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
(A)
..
IP THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE DID NOT HAVE POWER TO DISSOLVE THE
LEGISLATURE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD BE A
POSSIBILITY OF TOTAL DEADLOCK IN THE EVENT OP CONFLICT
BETWEEN THEM. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THIS WOULD BE
RESOLVED, EXCEPT BY THE INTERVENTION OF THE CPG. UNLESS
IT HAD THE POWER ITSELF TO DISSOLVE THE LEGISLATURE,
WHICH WOULD SEEM HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE, IT COULD ONLY REMOVE
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE. THIS STATE OP AFFAIRS COULD BE AN
UNDESIRABLE WEAKENING OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S POSITION
IN ANY TRIAL OF STRENGTH WITH THE LEGISLATURE.
ALTERNATIVBLY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE MIGHT LOOK TO PEKING TO
BACK HIM UP IN SOME UNCONSTITUTIONAL WAY. WE CONCLUDE
THEREFORE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE TO HAVE THE POWER, IN CERTAIN CAREFULLY-DEPINED
CIRCUMSTANCES, HIMSELF TO DISSOLVE THE LEGISLATURE (AS
THE GOVERNOR CAN NOW). THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN OUR
2
CONFIDENTIAL