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- 3 ·
a.
(e)
(E)
The
never sy to the Chiene-by see him power сай
Ret
3.
noted:
there was nothing in the Joint Declaration to justify the appointment by Peking of their own man as Governor. The Government of the Hong Kong SAR including the Chie f Executive would consist of local inhabitants and the SAR would be directly responsible to the CPG;
whatever they were called, there would have to be a distinction between the Governor and the Chief Executive if the latter was to be installed before 1997. While the Governor's powers would derive from London, the Chief Executive would then get his mandate from a local selection process, e.g. LegCo.
The following points
points of view by Members were
(a)
there was a danger that if a British Governor with responsibility for defence and foreign affairs remained in place until 30 June 1997, the Chinese would seize on this as an excuse for putting in their Own man with similar powers after
1997;
(b) we had to aim for the minimum disruption in 1997. Before then there should be a gradual transfer of power from the Governor to a Chief Executive. The dates for the transfer of the various powers might need to be reconsidered;
(c)
(d)
(e)
some Members suggested that the Governor's residual powers might be exercised in London (but see paragraph 2(a) and 2(d));
it might be difficult, if not impossible for HMG to intervene effectively after, say 1993, particularly if there were a recalcitrant Legislature (but paragraph 2(b));
see
the distinction between Governor and Chief Executive might somehow be blurred, e.g. by calling them Governor and Deputy Governor (but see paragraph 2(f). The Governor and Chief Executive's authority would come from different sources);
G.F. 316
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