May 4, 1961
Nationalist and Communist trade unions had, by and large, been quiescent and that elections would not necessarily there- fore bring the two big neighbours into an involvement (Mr. J. Matthews' letter to the Morning Post of September 21 et al.). Indeed the Standard argued in the opposite sense, say- ing that an unchanged Hongkong offered a "first-class excuse" for future intervention by Peking whereas reform would rob her of her potential role of "benevolent liberator" (September 21, 1960).
Mr. Bernacchi declared on October 26, 1960: "Hong- kong could never exist as an independent state responsible for its own external affairs. The moment British protection was removed, Hongkong would become a plaything in the battle of ideologies that we know exists in this part of the world, and one side or another would consider it imperative to control us." But this would not be affected by "some measure of electoral representation”.
Such is the confusion and the uncertainty of Hongkong's political future. There is some measure of discontent, one cause being the emergency laws. These are rarely used (one recent case of deportation that was widely resented locally was apparently one in which the authorities were satisfied of a narcotics smuggling offence but they lacked the evidence a court would need), but they constitute a brake on free discus- sion. For most Chinese there is hardly anywhere else to go, and deportation is no light risk. Irritation with the complacent ways of a Government grown used to being unquestioned (save at the long distance of Westminster) is also a factor.
Process of Sinification
Another cause is the racial factor that is inherent in all nationalisms. Recently the General Chamber of Commerce, spokesman for the big traders, admitted Chinese members to its executive committee for the first time; a non-Cantonese Chinese in Government service was promoted to a higher rank than the 'refugees' have been honoured with before; a Chinese has been appointed as Assistant Secretary in the Secretariat of Chinese Affairs and there are a good dozen or so Chinese cadet officers beginning to climb into the higher ranks of the administration; the first misgivings within the exclusively European Hong Kong Club have been expressed. There is a process of Sinification going on, slowly but surely, as well as a process of assimilation and acceptance of the 'northerners' who came in during the 1948-50 period. The coming formation of a new Chinese University is a straw in the wind.
We are now seeing the children of the 'refugees' begin- ning to take their place in Hongkong society as Hongkong- born. And the very educational revolution that has been carried on in the past decade and a half is turning out better-informed and bright young men and women who have been nurtured on the prose of Abraham Lincoln and John Stuart Mill. Intellectually these young citizens know the difference between Communism and Nationalism: emotionally their most immediate awareness is of a limitation on their participation in the affairs of the community and of the world. Last July, when the Tjimahi incident involving the shooting by Indonesian soldiers of two unarmed overseas Chinese women was angering Chinese communities all over the world, an architecture student who was president of the Hongkong University Students Union led a dignified but in- dignant delegation of formal protest to the Indonesian Consul-General (it was a little after a similar protest to the French Consul-General over Algeria).
Someone complained in the newspapers afterwards that the students were indulging in politics, recalling some 'un-
*
CHINA'S ANNUAL SURPLUS ON VISIBLE TRADE & WITH; HONGKONG
CONVERTED INTO US $ FROM THE HONGKONG GOVERNMENTS HK$ FIGURES AT SIX TO ONE
215
US $ MILLION
-200
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1950 1957 1958 1959 1960
93
-150-
100-
"
ruly' students of the 1920's and their fate. "We are not the students of the 1920's... the Student President replied in the Morning Post of July 28, "we are
no longer children,
.(N)obody can make stooges of us This is the new generation of Hongkong adolescent, and it is not easy to devise ways of satisfying its yearnings for the full life and at the same time not increase the chances of either economic or political suicide (through a loss of con- fidence and flight of capital, or the inducement to political intervention) later on.
So far the balance of advantages for Peking has seemed to lie with co-existence: the Colony is one of the biggest sources of foreign exchange for China as well as a convenient exchange market. But one cannot bank on the factors always being weighed entirely rationally. In the event of a wave of anti-colonial sentiment China might act against her self- interest and if she is by that time to some extent brought out of her isolation she may find it psychologically difficult to continue a 'hands-off' policy.
No doubt violence is unlikely, partly because the eco- nomic advantage of taking the place over as a going concern would be so enormous partly because other measures (a trade boycott, sealing the border, severing all contacts of any kind) would probably render the place only marginally viable- although this is disputed. But if pressure of these and other kinds is put to surrender the lease prematurely (and maybe more), to what lengths would a British Government -or, for that matter, a self-governing Hongkong Govern- ment-carry a refusal?
This is the kind of crystal-gazing to which one is re- duced in assessing the middle-term and long-term future. Meanwhile businessmen are still investing on the basis of a five-year return (some of them even more) and as long as they do that (and the Government plans ahead in terms of decades) there is no serious concern.
In Hongkong many of the rules of nationalism and colonial history do not apply. Of the 3 million inhabitants, for one thing, some two-thirds voluntarily chose the place as a (temporary?) home and so the 'imperialism', if any, could be argued as being by consent: there is no restraint on exit. No one doubts, for another thing, that these people could, if necessary, rule themselves: the Chinese middle class in Hongkong is substantial, able, industrious and sophisticated.
And yet this backbone of the Hongkong community does indeed maintain a "conspiracy of silence" about its political future which defies the observer's efforts to predict the outcome. Why? Because of its history, or its geography? Because silence is the price of survival in Hongkong's ideo- logical sandwich?