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REPLACED WITH 'MANY OF THEM'?
PARA 7. WOULD THIS MORE PROPERLY FORM PART OF THE
'CHINESE OBJECTIVES' SECTION IN PARA 5?
PARA 8. WE SUGGEST YOU ADD A REFERENCE AT THE END TO
CHINESE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE RIGHT STRUCTURE FOR HONG
KONG AFTER 1997.
PARA 10 ET SEQ. LEGAL ADVISERS NOTE THAT YOU DRAW AN
IMPLICIT PARALLEL BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND 'AN
EXECUTIVE' OR EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES. THEY ARE NOT SURE
THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION JUSTIFIES THIS.
EXCO, AT
PRESENT, IS AN ADVISORY BODY. THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES
AT PRESENT IN HONG KONG ARE THE GOVERNOR, THE SECRETARIES
AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. WE AGREE THAT WE MAY WELL WISH
TO DRAW A PARALLEL BETWEEN EXCO AND THE FUTURE
'EXECUTIVE', BUT WONDER WHETHER THE ISSUE OF WHAT THE
CHINESE MIGHT ENVISAGE BY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES SHOULD
NOT BE FURTHER EXPLORED?
PARA 11. THE WORDING OF THE LAST SENTENCE SUGGESTS THAT
THE EXISTING DISTRIBUTION CANNOT BE IMPROVED UPON. IS
THIS PERHAPS OVERSTATED?
PARA 13. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO LIST THE OPTIONS AS YOU
SEE THEM.
PARA 14. WE ASSUME THAT THE PHRASE THEY MAY BE READY'
IN SECOND SENTENCE MEANS 'THEY MIGHT EVENTUALLY ACCEPT'?
WE WONDER IF THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE IS NOT OVERSTATED:
PERHAPS CHINESE OBJECTIONS TO A MINISTERIAL SYSTEM WOULD
DEPEND UPON THE MEANS USED TO SELECT THE MINISTERS.
PARA 16. WE ARE NOT SURE IT IS RIGHT TO INCLUDE LAST TWO SENTENCES AS DRAFTED. THIS IS AFTER ALL THE ARGUMENT THE
CHINESE MAY WELL USE TO RESIST ANY BUT THE MOST MINOR
CHANGES BETWEEN NOW AND 1997.
PARA 19. WE AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF THIS, BUT WONDER WHETHER THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT THAT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OBTAIN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE LEGISLATURE, WOULD
IN FACT BE WIDELY SUPPORTED IN HONG KONG.
PARA 20, FIFTH SENTENCE. 'OUR' SHOULD BE 'YOUR'.
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