HE PLIGHT OF KHMER REFUGEES
is difficult to accept that the most durable, much less humane, solution is to transport hmer rice farmers from Khao I Dang to California. If the closing and movement of the mp had been called a “relocation, "instead of a threatened “repatriation, "we would not w be processing this population.
Over 300.000 Khmer displaced persons are now in hailand or encamped along the Thai-Cambodian order. The flow began in early 1979 after Vietnamese rces toppled the Pol Pot dictatorship, perhaps one this century's bloodiest regimes. Within a matter of ceks, tens of thousands of Cambodians began fleeing 12 Khmer Rouge and the advancing Vietnamese
rmy.
After some 150.000 Khmer were admitted by hailand in 1979-mostly to the Khao Dang amp-the Thais became alarmed over the escalating ow and adopted a policy of, first, forcibly returning. nem, and then, finally allowing them to stay in camps long the border. From the outset, the Khmer were ot considered refugees, but displaced persons.
The UNHCR became involved only with those first rrivals who were admitted to Khao I Dang, which the Thais called a "holding center." The refugees could tay there until conditions permitted their return to Cambodia. Subsequent arrivals came under the newly .reated program of the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), which was established in 1980 to provide emergency food, medicine and other assistance to the Khmer population along the border,
which today numbers approximately 260,000.
The Thai strategy is to keep the Khmer along the border. For now, Thailand appears satisfied that this human barrier is in its national interest as a buffer against Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia. The Vietnamese forces are fighting Khmer guerrillas who are mixed in with and supported by the border population.
Although Thailand officially stopped admitting Khmer after February 1980, their continued surrepti- tious entry from the border into holding centers, which are only a few miles from the border, prompted the Thais to undertake a one-time registration in late 1982 and early 1983, assisted by the UNHCR.
Thus, only those who, by chance, arrived prior to February 1980, or who were subsequently registered, have become eligible for third country resettlement. But in practical terms, there is no real difference in the characteristics of the people in the camps in Thailand. and those along the border.
After the registration of the Khmer was completed in 1983, the United States began to screen those who might be eligible for resettlement. Since 1975, the United States has admitted over 103,000 Khmer
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The time has come for the UNHCR and the inter- tional community to undertake the kind of diplomatic forts that preceded the 1979 Geneva conference on dochinese refugees, which led to a reduction in the assive boat flow. All parties involved should review the urrent situation in Southeast Asia with a view to topting new policies for dealing with refugees and igrants. In this, the key ingredients will be individual reening and the option of repatriation.
In the case of Laos, UNHCR officers should thor- ughly review all new arrivals. If they did this, most bservers believe only a few refugees would be accepted nd the vast majority could be denied asylum by Thai uthorities after appropriate review with UNHCR ob- ervers. They would, in effect, be denied entry, not be repatriated" back to Laos. The issue of voluntary or nvoluntary repatriation would simply not arise, as it loes not for Pakistanis denied asylum in Berlin or Haitians in Florida. But the role of the UNHCR is rucial.
With Vietnam and Cambodia, the issue will be vastly nore difficult. But to say a negotiated repatriation will be lifficult should not be to say it should not be tried. Such egotiations will inevitably involve giving some incen-
tives to Vietnam, and we should be prepared to cooperate in offering them.
Finally, it would not be unreasonable for resettlement countries to condition their future resettlement of re- fugees on some evidence that the UNHCR is finding alternative solutions to third country resettlement for new arrivals from Indochina. Historically, the UNHCR has always stated that third country resettlement was the least preferred durable solution, and that repatriation or local settlement were much preferable. After nearly a decade of Indochinese resettlement, it is time to see some evidence that this preference is being pursued.
Orderly Departure
Another option for coping with the Indochinese flow is the expansion of the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), which was negotiated by the UNHCR with Vietnam in 1979. Established with the goal of providing both a legal and safer avenue to leaving Vietnam by boat, the ODP has slowly gained momentum. In 1984, more Indochinese moved through ODP than arrived by boats in asylum countries. We should spare no diplomatic