to regard as equal to Convention refugees those asylum-seekers who could not
qualify under the 1951 Convention in whose cases it was for the discretion of
States how they should be dealt with once the asylum procedure had been
exhausted. If such was the case, UNHCR's staff must have been completely disappointed because no State expressed an intention or willingness formally to extend the scope of its refugee provisions to cover what are generally regarded as humanitarian cases.
5. In this atmosphere, it is probably not surprising that the announcement in
London on 29 May of the visa regime for Sri Lankans caused little stir. UNHCR officials accepted it with what might be described as regretful resignation but the High Commissioner, on 30 May, sought me out and, in a private conversation,
first of all expressed regret that HMG had felt the need to impose the regime
since it could mean that a genuine refugee would be stopped from leaving his
country of origin to seek protection but then went on to say that, having himself
been a politician, he could well understand the difficulties faced by Ministers
which caused them to take the step. On the possible return of failed Tamil
asylum-seekers, he expressed similar regret and understanding and asked whether
all had access to asylum procedures and whether we had considered any follow-up
once individuals were returned to Colombo; I was able to assure him on both counts.
He then referred to his forthcoming visit to London and indicated that his prime
purpose was to discover whether any progress might be made in the movement of
Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong. He did not intend to raise the Tamil question
but he would quite clearly have to respond to press and media enquiries by repeating his office's line that, in their opinion, no Tamil was safe in Sri Lanka
and should not, for the present, be returned there.
6. On the question of Vietnamese from Hong Kong, he said that his recent visit
to the Colony had convinced him that some movement, especially from the closed
camps, was needed and he said that any significant relaxation on our part would,
more than likely, be reflected by other potential receiving States. He
personally could see little advantage in further discussion between States, what
was needed was a move on someone's part and he was looking to the United Kingdom
to make it. He had been impressed with the SCORRI report insofar as it sought
to deal with the Vietnamese problem; he understood our difficulties but hoped
that his visit might prove the moving point in the present deadlock.
7. In reply, I said that I was unable to tell him, at that stage, the final
response to SCORRI on Vietnamese but could assure him that Ministers and
officials were presently considering the Recommendations, particularly the
/question of the
C