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(b)
Involuntary repatriation to Vietnam
16. The Hong Kong Government has proposed
since 1982.
this on several occasions
The proposals are based
on the premise that the
majority of arrivals are now not true refugees, and they should
therefore be treated in the same way as persons from other countries
seeking to enter Hong Kong: new arrivals would be screened, and
those who lacked either proper documentation or convincing grounds
on which to claim asylum would
lum would be treated as illegal immigrants and
returned to Vietnam. Only those able to provide convincing grounds
on which to claim asylum as refugees would
be granted it.
would be in keeping with Hong Kong's treatment of illegal immigrants
from China, who have been repatriated since 1974.
This
17. The arguments in favour of such a course are that it would
certainly be effective as a deterrent, that even where the deterrent
failed to work it could dispose of a good part of the problem posed
by future refugee arrivals, and that it is justified by the
non-refugee nature of a large proportion of recent arrivals. It
would be popular in Hong Kong, and would probably allow the closed
camp policy to be abandoned.
It would be consistent with our policy
on illegal immigration from China.
to
18. Arguments against are that the course would be likely to
to be
generally unpopular with public and parliamentary opinion here, and
would encounter vociferous objection from the refugee lobby. Since
Hong Kong has no land boundary with Vietnam and aircraft or ships
would need to be used, there could be considerable physical
difficulty in carrying out repatriation, and a high profile could
not be avoided. Indeed it would be required if the policy were
be effectively. It would be difficult to secure UNHCR Cooperation
with such a programme (although there are some conflicting views
within UNHCR) and impossible unless the Vietnamese Government had
given credible assurances that they would not illtreat persons
returned to Vietnam. Such assurances would also be essential from
the point of view of public and parliamentary opinion, and in order
to avoid breaching our obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. On available evidence it will be
very difficult to secure either Vietnamese
agreement to receive back
the persons concerned, or assurances as to their treatment.
The
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