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negative. We risk a sharp response.
(2) Even discussing the possibility with the Vietnamese is
likely to get us across the UNHCR, and there would certainly be
severe public criticism if an approach became known publicly.
15. On balance we consider that the arguments in favour of instructing HM Ambassador Hanoi to speak to
to speak to the Vietnamese
Government are the stronger. We should need to try to clear our
lines with UNHCR first, although it is plain from what the UN High
Commissioner said to Mr Luce on 12 March that UNHCR are against involuntary repatriation as a matter of principle. If the approach were to become public (which we would seek to avoid), we should defend it by saying that there will be no question of involuntary
repatriation unless credible and satisfactory assurances are
received, but that the seriousness of the situation in the camps
in Hong Kong obliges us to explore every avenue for containing the problem. (Our defence would be all the stronger if we were then
doing all we could to take refugees for resettlement in the UK).
16.
Improved Training Facilities
Any scheme which makes refugees more acceptable to resettlement
countries is obviously useful. Much is already being done in this
respect, and the Hong Kong Government are considering further means
to provide refugees with appropriate skills. They should be
encouraged to pursue this question vigorously with UNHCR.
29 March 1985
A C Galsworthy
Hong Kong Department
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